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Abstract 
Among the diverse approaches to comparison in socio-legal studies, those that employ qualitative 
research, richness of detail and attention to context are the focus of this special issue. The 
Introduction draws on comparative law and social science literature to argue that comparison 
amongst studies of laws in contexts can follow different trajectories: the comparison may start from 
an assumption of similarity – in form, purposes or context – in order to identify significant 
differences; or it may identify significant similarity across social and cultural divides. What unites 
many of the projects of comparison undertaken by qualitative empirical researchers is that the 
points of relevant comparison are identified within the complexity of the empirical studies at hand; 
and they are allowed to emerge, or change, as the researcher comes to understand the facts and 
issues more deeply. 
 
I. Introduction 
As the field of socio-legal studies has diversified, the goal of understanding ‘law in society’ has 
expanded into the goals of understanding ‘laws in societies’. The field is characterised by research 
into the nature and role of different types of law and legal phenomena, as well as the part they play 
in different types of society. It seems important, then, to ask about the ways in which scholars are 
taking advantage of the possibilities offered by comparison amongst such examples. In what ways 
are empirical studies of laws in various contexts being brought into comparison with one another, 
either explicitly or implicitly? How do such exercises differ from, or relate to, the projects 
traditionally pursued by comparative lawyers? Is there a distinctive element to comparison involving 
qualitative empirical studies? It is the last question on which this special issue concentrates. The 
possibilities for comparison are not limited to what might be described as ‘law’, but also encompass 
informal legal norms and processes, and related understandings and attitudes. 
The themes and debates developed in comparative law often touch upon questions and issues 
explored by socio-legal scholars, such as the relevance of context to legal change. There have been 
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calls to expand the field. But how, if at all, can we compare the results of detailed empirical research, 
let alone case-studies from very different social legal traditions? David Nelken (in his paper in this 
issue) notes recurrent problems with attempts to use indicators to compare across contexts. He 
refers to criticisms about the misleading nature of many measures and variables, about the 
problems presented by differences in cross-national meanings and local understandings, and about 
the need to look behind statistics. There is an evident need to explore alternative approaches. In this 
Introduction, we review some of these debates and the issues they have identified for socio-legal 
research. 
There is, of course, no single right approach to comparison, and different purposes lead to the use of 
different methods, with different outcomes. Indeed, the variety of possible comparative questions 
and methods is a feature of the rich and complex field of socio-legal studies. The purpose of the 
comparison is generally analysis and interpretation, rather than evaluation or prescription. 
Sociolegal scholars may not be concerned with the goals of legal change, the promotion or criticism 
of legal convergence, European harmonisation or processes of globalisation (cf. Nelken, 2007, p. 17, 
and in this issue). But descriptive and analytic work may, nevertheless, lay the foundation for the 
projects of those with more practical aims. Indeed, such projects often benefit from the sort of 
empirical detail with which we are here concerned. Several different possibilities are illustrated by 
the papers in this special issue. 
In this Introduction, we discuss how scholars can employ qualitative research, richness of detail and 
attention to context as the basis for comparison, often using case-studies as a starting point, and 
allowing specific points of comparison to emerge from the material at hand. Qualitative and 
comparative work within the broader social sciences highlights the possibilities offered by using such 
material as the basis for illuminating socio-legal comparisons; both caution and inspiration can be 
found in the related debates. A number of different approaches to qualitative, socio-legal 
comparison are illustrated by the papers in this special issue. 
II. Comparative law and socio-legal research 
Recent years have seen calls for comparative lawyers to pay attention to the social contexts of the 
laws they consider and to study diversity as well as similarity (Reimann, 2002, p. 671; Cotterrell, 
2006, p. 710; 2007, p. 133; Dannemann, 2006; Nelken, 2007, pp. 19–25). But how is this to be done? 
Classical approaches to comparison identify difference – in legal substance, process or institutions – 
against a background of similarity. This is generally found in the overall structure of a legal system or 
the social problems it seeks to address. Most European states have, for example, developed 
comparable, albeit not identical, laws concerning the formation of contracts, the institution of 
marriage and many matters of public administration, as well as similar legal processes. In such 
contexts, noting difference – including systemic difference between civil- and common-law systems 
– can be undertaken against a backdrop of substantial similarity. Social context might, then, be 
relevant for explaining difference, or change and development (Nelken, 2007, pp. 21–27). 
The distinctive ‘functionalist’ approach identifies a basis for comparison in the social problems 
addressed by a legal regime: it starts from the assumption that ‘the legal system of every society 
faces essentially the same problems, and solves these problems by quite different means though 
very often with similar results’ (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, p. 102; Graziadei, 2006). The points of 
similarity that form the basis for comparison are here identified in social goals and this approach has 
been credited with a turn towards ‘context’ (Michaels, 2006, p. 340; Riles, 1999, p. 235). But can the 
socio-legal scholar assume that societies always, or even commonly, face ‘the same’ problems? 
Appreciation of the fact that many social problems are ‘constructed’ puts this in doubt (Frankenberg, 
2006, pp. 444–445; Nelken, 2007, p. 33). This is not to undermine the value of a functionalist 
approach, so much as to indicate its limits. Mahy’s paper (in this issue) takes the criticisms seriously 
and outlines a successful functionalist comparison, which links different labour arrangements to 
subtle, and sometimes unexpected, differences in context, as well as to formal and informal 
regulation. 
When a functional approach is not appropriate, however, how are we to compare laws or legal 
systems that are substantially unlike or which seek to address different social problems; and how are 
we to describe the objects of comparison? Some scholars have advocated the study of ‘law in action’ 
(Palmer, 2005, p. 264; Reimann, 2002, p. 679); others the study of ‘legal culture’ (Cotterrell, 2006; 
Nelken, 2007, p. 29). It has been argued that comparative lawyers should study different ‘legal 
traditions’ (Glenn, 2000; 2006; Menski, 2006; Bussani and Mattei, 2012), ‘legal pluralism’ (Reimann, 
2002; Cotterrell, 2006) and ‘globalisation’ (Twining, 2001; 2007), as well as transnational laws. Calls 
for expansion in the scope of inquiry have been accompanied by calls to ‘open out’ the field to other 
disciplinary approaches (Nelken, 2007, pp. 16–19).2 However, as Örücü (2007, pp. 56–62) points out, 
scholars face a daunting task when trying to undertake comparison amongst non-Western and non-
state laws. Both legal culture and legal pluralism, as objects of study, have given rise to considerable 
disagreement (Cotterrell, 1997; Roberts, 2005) and hardly seem to provide a stable basis for the 
identification of significant differences. 
The issue that concerns scholars contemplating forms of comparison that go beyond doctrinal issues 
and span very different cultural contexts is the assumption of sufficient similarity in order to make 
the identification of difference meaningful. We need some way of speaking about the diversity of 
the human world without losing our grounding, to keep something firm in order to evaluate the 
significance of difference. This is particularly problematic when the subject matter is law in society or 
other socio-legal phenomena, which vary considerably and are found in different configurations, 
performing very different roles, across social contexts. Legrand (1997; 2001) insists that laws 
inevitably gain new meanings in different contexts, always coming to reflect historical and cultural 
norms, assumptions and understandings. On his view, both cross-cultural understanding and 
linguistic translation are inherently problematic, such that foreign law becomes an almost 
‘unconquerable alien’ (Demleitner, 1999; Whitman, 2003, p. 322). This argument assumes radical 
differences amongst ‘cultures’ and, we suggest, raises an idealistic vision of law as ‘a product 
embedded in the special legal culture of the local actors’ (Graziadei, 2006, pp. 467–470). Empirical 
studies of legal imposition and borrowing significantly undermine the universality of this assumption 
(Graziadei, 2006; Frankenberg, 2006, pp. 445–446; Pirie, 2014, p. 79).3 Laws may mirror normative 
assumptions shared by members of a society, but they may also be imposed or borrowed. The 
meaning of legal rules and categories is not entirely determined by context and culture. Laws, 
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themselves, ‘construct authoritative images of social relationships and actions’ (Merry, 1990, pp. 8–
9); they influence the meaning of basic categories, such as property, contract, trust, responsibility 
and guilt (Cotterrell, 1998, p. 177). Laws can mirror underlying social norms and assumptions, then, 
but superficial similarity may mask different histories and assumptions and, as Whitman suggests, 
this in itself can provide a basis for comparison. Whitman (2003, p. 312) presents his comparison 
between the German and American legal concepts of ‘dignity’ as a move towards understanding 
difference and developing a sympathetic grasp of ‘other’ cultures. This is possible, he says, if we 
understand laws as normativesystems, which justify certain actions and which are themselves based 
on important, if tacit, assumptions (Whitman, 2003, pp. 334–336, 343). Laws can be a window onto 
society, then, although historical and social inquiry may be necessary in order to tease out the 
origins and roles of the concepts and rules in question. If a superficially similar concept, like ‘dignity’, 
reflects different historical assumptions in Germany and the US, this tells us something about the 
societies in question. However, when laws are borrowed from other contexts, or manipulated for 
particular purposes, they may be the product of other, equally interesting and comparable, 
dynamics. In each case, empirical detail helps the researcher identify the relevant points of 
comparison, whether in the substance or the form of laws, the ways in which they have come about, 
the roles they play and the basic assumptions they reflect. 
How, then, do we compare without imposing our own categories, or a perception of similar 
‘problems’, on those we study? These, we suggest, are not issues that can ever be wholly overcome. 
In order to set up meaningful comparison, we have to assume, and make explicit, certain points of 
similarity. In the case of comparison between countries, this might involve identifying shared 
histories or cultures within a geographical region, or a similar nation-building project following a 
revolution; or, in the case of more local comparison, we might assume shared concerns to address 
deviance or to regulate access to natural resources. In such cases, contrasting the laws, legal 
practices or attitudes to law can become meaningful. What is important for the empirical scholar is 
to be aware of the attendant assumptions – about historical and cultural similarity, or common 
human concerns – and the possibility that even the most basic assumptions may be confounded on 
closer empirical study. 
Three papers in this special issue illustrate the way in which choice of appropriately general subjects, 
leading to carefully controlled studies, might address these issues. As Hertogh and Kurkchiyan 
demonstrate, ‘legal consciousness’ is a sufficiently general term to allow comparison across 
European contexts. Their empirical research reveals important differences in the ‘collective legal 
consciousness’ of people in different European countries. They are able to link these differences – in 
attitudes towards the meaning and significance of law – to general attitudes towards the political 
system in each country. In other projects, the process of delving further into the case-studies at 
hand might prompt the scholar to change or nuance the terms of comparison as the research 
proceeds, either fundamentally or in matters of detail. This approach is described by both Mahy and 
Creutzfeldt in their papers in this special issue. Mahy developed a functionalist framework for 
comparing labour arrangements on the basis of qualitative pilot studies, while Creutzfeldt’s 
comparison of attitudes to European ombudsmen emerged from the answers to openended 
questions contained in more controlled surveys. 
Two other papers (Kubal and Pritchard) start from a single case-study, letting the empirical material 
suggest the terms of comparison. Qualitative empirical research is often associated with the detailed 
exploration of particular cases or limited samples and these studies demonstrate their potential for 
the comparative scholar. Empirical complexity is only a problem for such work if the terms of 
comparison are assumed to be fixed at the outset. Of course, the need for flexibility and adjustment 
during the course of research poses its own challenges, but qualitative researchers often have to 
address the unexpected. How, then, have other social science researchers addressed the issue of 
comparison using qualitative empirical data and thick description? The debates on case-study 
comparison, in particular, have highlighted several issues that are relevant for the socio-legal 
researcher using qualitative material, as we discuss in the following section. 
III. A social science perspective on qualitative comparisons 
Comparative lawyers were not the first to employ a qualitative approach to comparison, paying 
attention to the richness of detail and the social context across a relatively small number of cases. 
Mathias Siems, in his most recent handbook of comparative law, seems surprised with his ‘discovery’ 
of ‘a number of instances where non-legal researchers have dealt with topics of a genuine 
comparative legal nature’ (Siems, 2014, p. 313). This section reviews some of these debates and the 
critiques relevant for the project of comparison in socio-legal studies. Most of these have involved 
case-studies, often known as ‘small-N’ comparisons. Of course, not all comparative research involves 
case-studies and not all case-studies involve comparison,4 but debates about their intersection are 
often informative for qualitative empirical comparison more generally. 
What are known as ‘small-N’ comparisons (Lijphart, 1971) have been ubiquitous in comparative 
social science research in sociology, politics, history and international relations. This terminology 
emerged in the 1970s, when large-scale comparisons (characterising the early stages of social 
science research, which often aimed to explain phenomena worldwide) were overshadowed by 
comparisons involving a small number of cases, often analysed over long periods (della Porta, 2008, 
p. 213). Growing attention to interpretative social science stressed the relevance of ‘thick 
descriptions’ of few, purposefully selected cases (Geertz, 1973). In the early 1990s, much of the work 
aimed at a limited generalisability, with middle-range or even lower-level theories, for which the 
specificities of the local historical and socio-political context played a crucial role (Mair, 1996).  
Whilst, more recently, some scholars have been advocating use of larger number of cases, due to 
the development of new statistical methodologies for multi-case comparison (della Porta, 2008, p. 
213), those researchers who emphasise the contribution of interpretative work and qualitative 
approaches still value small-N, case-study comparisons. They are praised for their detailed 
knowledge of social processes at different points in time and considered as particularly useful for the 
accommodation of social contexts (della Porta, 2008, p. 211). 
Discussions of this comparative work have often revolved around the starting point, whether 
similarity or difference, reflecting our discussion of the starting point for comparative law, in Section 
II, above. Some studies start with ‘the most similar cases’, as the optimal samples for comparative 
enquiry, suggesting that the research design in which the cases share many background or ‘systemic’ 
characteristics (economic, cultural or political) allows more controlled explanation of differences 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p. 32). It is suggested that, if important differences are found among 
otherwise similar cases, then ‘the number of factors attributable to these differences will be 
sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those differences alone’ (Przeworski and Teune, 
1970, p. 32). Other studies, by contrast, start with the selection of ‘most different cases’ and focus 
on an in-depth comparative analysis of a few, carefully selected shared phenomena, such as social 
movements, especially when little is known about them. Given disparate environments, this is a 
particularly useful way to address certain theoretical problems, such as what we mean by a ‘social 
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movement’, how they come about, how they develop and under what circumstances (Collier et al., 
2004; Tarrow, 2010). 
Both approaches might be adopted by socio-legal scholars. Indeed, the well-established position of 
small-N comparisons in social science should encourage the project of qualitative empirical 
comparisons in socio-legal studies. However, during the course of a long history of conceptual 
developments and shifts, comparative studies based on a small number of carefully selected cases 
have been heavily criticised from different sides of the methodological and epistemological 
spectrum (Steinmetz, 2004, p. 371). Positivist critiques have doubted the scientific value of small-N 
comparisons by referring to their merely ‘idiographic’ nature, suggesting they are of limited, mainly 
descriptive, relevance (Rueschemeyer, 2003). A more orthodox ‘interpretivist’ critique raises the 
issue of incommensurability of experiences and hence the impossibility of meaningful comparison 
between different contexts (Steinmetz, 2004). ‘Post-modernist’ critiques have questioned the 
extension of Western or European (implicitly cultural) categories to non-Western or ‘dominated’ 
social groups more generally, from the perspective of ‘imperialism’ (Lyotard, 1988). 
These critiques all deserve attention and, by addressing them, we can refine the qualitative 
comparative approach in the socio-legal field and demonstrate more clearly its virtues. 
To start with the ‘positivist’ critiques: scholars stressing objectivity, rigour and generalisability as the 
goals of social science research have criticised small-N qualitative comparisons. Theda Stocpol 
(1984), for example, argued that theoretically rigorous explanations can only be achieved through 
comparative research of a series of necessary and sufficient causes for a particular event. Charles 
Ragin, in turn, holds that comparative knowledge delivers ‘the key to understanding, explaining and 
interpreting’ (1987, p. 6), provided that the techniques are based on Boolean algebra. The 
implication is that a qualitative, or small-N, approach to comparison can only describe; it cannot 
explain particular phenomena. Sartori summarises the broader dilemma that seems to haunt many 
social science comparativists: ‘case studies sacrifice generality to depth and thickness of 
understanding, indeed to Verstehen: one knows more and better about less (less in extension). 
Conversely, [large-scale] comparative studies sacrifice understanding-in-context – and of context – 
to inclusiveness: one knows less about more’ (1991, p. 253). 
As Emma Carmel (1999) convincingly argues, however, this sets up a false dichotomy between 
contextualisation (rich description) and conceptualisation (generalisability and theory building) in 
comparative research. The separation of ‘understanding’ from ‘explanation’ is artificial and 
analytically unhelpful, as one actually presupposes the other (Carmel, 1999, p. 143). A comparative 
case-study approach engages with different contexts, which in turn facilitates the conceptualisation 
of core common features of a particular process, experience or event, without any loss of rigour 
(Rueschemeyer, 1991, quoted in Carmel, 1999, p. 143). These conceptualisations are, in turn, 
embedded in the context from which they arise and thus concretely linked to particular times and 
places (Carmel, 1999, p. 143) making any theory building actually ‘for someone and for some 
purpose’ (Cox, 1981). Qualitative data inform generality and explain uniqueness (Bradshaw and 
Wallace, 1991), while the appreciation of context can refine the assumption or description of both 
similarity and difference, allowing finer comparison, even if less wide-ranging. 
The interpretivist critiques of qualitative comparisons are primarily centred on the concepts of 
incommensurability and incomparability. Some refuse any reference to underlying causes and reject 
the idea of commensuration across ‘social mechanisms’ (Steinmetz, 2004, p. 384). The idea of 
‘incommensurability’ suggests that ‘we have no measure, or no common measure, for something – 
in other words all concepts are context embedded to the point of being inescapably idiosyncratic’ 
(Sartori, 1991, p. 252). A related critique of comparison argues that ‘we are not justified in classifying 
two individuals or groups as examples of the same thing if they understand themselves under 
different descriptions’ (Steinmetz, 2004, p. 385). Steinmetz illustrates this critique by saying that ‘a 
comparison of, say, positivists and nonpositivists in social science, would be rejected from this 
position to the extent that the groups in question refuse this definition of themselves’ (2004, p. 385). 
This debate within the broader social science literature strikes a familiar cord with critiques of 
comparison and qualitative studies of law conducted by legal scholars, discussed in the previous 
section (Legrand, 1997; 2001; Demleitner, 1999). But the idea of incommensurability is an extreme 
position – analytical concepts put forward by social science researchers to understand and compare 
contextually different experiences are always ‘generalizations in disguise, mental containers that 
amalgamate an endless flow of discrete perceptions and conceptions’ (Sartori, 1991, p. 252). 
Generalising concepts are heuristics that inform the research endeavour; indeed, they are part of 
the process by which we make everyday life intelligible, and this does not, of itself, undermine the 
resulting analysis. The aim, as anthropologists have remarked, is often adequate analytic description, 
rather than cross-culturally valid generalisation (Parkin, 1987, p. 12). 
A related critique of incommensurability is made by post-modernists, who argue that the application 
of comparative concepts originating from the ‘West’ in non-Western contexts is a form of analytical 
imperialism, reproducing the asymmetry of power between the observer and the observed 
(Steinmetz, 2004, p. 387). Non-Western societies and subaltern groups are more likely to be 
analysed in terms of the categories of the Western and dominant cultures than vice versa 
(Steinmetz, 2004, p. 388). As a result, concepts like ‘civil society’, ‘the state’ or ‘feudalism’ have on 
too many occasions been used in comparative social science research only to show that they are 
lacking or only partially present in specific, non-Western settings (Chakrabarty, 2000). 
Clifford and Marcus, writing about the politics of ethnography, have called upon qualitative 
researchers to exercise caution when applying such comparative concepts in the context of 
colonialism or global inequality, as they may disavow the radical difference of the non-Western 
social order, its unique or incommensurable aspects (Clifford and Marcus, 1986). François Lyotard, in 
the spirit of post-modernism, goes even further and theorises this asymmetry with the concept of 
differend, when the regulation of epistemological conflict between the observer and the observed is 
‘done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that 
idiom’ (Lyotard, 1988, p. 6, quoted in Steinmetz, 2004). In legal anthropology, similar issues were 
raised even earlier, by Bohannan (1963), who argued against Gluckman (1965) that Western legal 
concepts such as ‘the reasonable man’ could not be applied in African contexts. 
Although the debate was inconclusive, it is now accepted that careful choice of terms can lead to 
fruitful comparison, enriching analysis and understanding (Holy, 1987). Moore’s (1973) seminal work 
on the semi-autonomous social field, for example, drew analogies between New York garment 
traders and Tanzanian farmers, while Greenhouse, Yngvesson and Engel (1994) have drawn 
illuminating conclusions from comparison of attitudes to law in three American towns. 
We can reasonably ask whether the use of Western concepts in qualitative, small-scale comparative 
research has always, even often, been done unreflexively and in an ‘imperial’ manner. Although the 
idea of ‘state law’ might be inappropriate for the pre-colonial history of the Indian subcontinent, 
does this rule out the use and potential analytical applicability of all concepts originating from 
‘Western’ social science? Bourdieu’s works on Béarn peasants (Bourdieu, 1990), Frenchman in 
general (Bourdieu, 1984) and the Kabyle (Bourdieu, 1977), although concerned with practices as 
diverse as the system of succession in Béarn, the interior disposition of the Kabyle dwelling or the 
distribution of tasks and periods in the course of the Kabyle year, have made analytical use of the 
concepts such as ‘fecundity, succession, education, hygiene, social or economic investment, 
marriage, etc.’ (De Certeau, 1984, p. 52). 
Although Bourdieu rarely discussed the topic of comparison directly, his work was deeply 
comparative, concerned with different figurations of race, class and gender (Steinmetz, 2004). In 
Bourdieu’s sociology, the Kabyle dwelling could be read as the inverse of the French school, in which 
he saw the ‘reproduction’ of the social hierarchies and the repetition of their ideologies (De Certeau, 
1984, p. 52). Bourdieu’s approach relied on the use of analogy to analyse and compare these 
procedures and practices (De Certeau, 1984, pp. 54–55). The use of analogy seems less imposing and 
more open to negotiation than comparison based on defined categories; it can open up a simple 
case-study to richer interpretation and analysis, by identifying similarity between things that are 
otherwise dissimilar for the purpose of explanation or clarification. 
In the following section, we demonstrate how the use of analogy, like the conceptualisation of core 
common features and the use of generalisations as heuristics, can all be used in socio-legal 
comparison, by referring to the papers in this special issue. 
IV. Using qualitative empirical data for comparison in socio-legal research 
The goals of rich qualitative description and nuanced understanding have, we suggest, been 
underappreciated in the field of comparative law. For many comparativists, the object, whether 
explicit or implicit, has been to identify differences as the basis for programmes of legal change and 
reform, as Nelken describes (in this issue). The identification of suitable indicators or terms of 
comparison is necessary in order to evaluate the significance of difference, for instrumental ends. 
But comparison can also be used to highlight the ways in which people do things in similar ways. The 
object here is often a more nuanced understanding of law in context, on its own terms. Some 
comparativists seem to dismiss the value of description and understanding as ends in themselves, 
denigrating such exercises as ‘butterfly collecting’ or ‘mere description’, as opposed to the practical 
aims of justification, legitimation and evaluation, as Mahy discusses (in this issue). But must 
comparison have a practical or evaluative purpose? We would suggest that, at the very least, the 
assessment or evaluation of laws and legal processes in very different cultural contexts must be 
preceded by a thorough understanding of the context on its own terms if any form of comparison is 
to avoid the pitfalls described by Nelken. Identifying a meaningful subject for comparison – and 
using qualitative data to do so – may be illuminating in its own right, although it may also provide 
the starting point for more evaluative or policy-oriented studies. 
This special issue includes three studies in which the authors have allowed the richness of empirical 
detail, drawn from qualitative research, to determine the basis for their comparison. Mahy used 
qualitative pilot studies to identify a meaningful functional basis for her comparison of labour 
arrangements, which would work across national and cultural divides. The goals of employers in the 
restaurant sector in cities of Australia and Indonesia, she found, were sufficiently similar to allow for 
meaningful comparison, and her study indicates the relevance of a variety of factors – formal and 
informal regulation, religion and family ideals – in explaining both similarity and differences between 
them. The same starting point might not work elsewhere – in more traditional contexts where 
employer and employee relations do not take shape in the same way – but Mahy’s familiarity with 
the cultural context of both research sites allowed her to define a meaningful subject for 
comparison. 
Creutzfeldt set out to undertake a disciplined comparison of attitudes towards European 
ombudsmen, based on wide-ranging surveys containing carefully defined questions for ombudsmen 
users. This indicated remarkable similarity across national European borders. However, her more 
open-ended questions also elicited a range of discursive responses, which demonstrated striking 
differences in the language used by respondents in the UK and in Germany to describe their 
expectations. Creutzfeldt went on to explore links between the nature of these expectations and 
what other scholars have identified as nationally distinct legal cultures in Europe. The qualitative 
data elicited by the general questions of the surveys, that is, produced an unexpected and 
illuminating point of contrast. 
Returning, then, to the question of what is to be compared, we are suggesting that robust and 
culturally appropriate forms of comparison may result when the terms are allowed to emerge, or are 
nuanced, on the basis of close familiarity with the material at hand. This is true of the study by 
Hertogh and Kurkchiyan (in this issue). These researchers, who have long experience of research on 
legal consciousness in European settings, have advanced the concept of ‘collective legal 
consciousness’, originally developed by Kurkchiyan (2011), in order to compare attitudes towards 
law and its meaning in different European countries. Surveys and focus groups were carefully 
designed to elicit relevant views, which allowed the authors to link the respondents’ attitudes 
towards law to their attitudes towards politics more generally. The open-ended nature of the 
discussions produced material that offers a vivid description of opinions and attitudes, adding depth 
and richness to the authors’ conclusions about the nature of the attitudes expressed. 
Mahy, Creutzfeldt, and Hertogh and Kurkchiyan have all, then, undertaken disciplined forms of 
comparison which are based on qualitative data-gathering. The results of their research have both 
shaped the terms of the comparisons they ultimately draw, as well as adding depth and richness to 
their conclusions. By contrast, Kubal and Pritchard (in this special issue) allowed the terms of their 
comparisons to emerge from a single study. This is characteristic of a social scientific, qualitative 
approach to comparison, whereby a detailed case-study is interpreted by analogy with (Bourdieu, 
1984; De Certeau, 1984, pp. 54–55), or in contrast to, other cases specifically chosen to illustrate 
similarity or difference (Pirie, 2014). This allows the researcher to explore and compare the complex 
ways in which people themselves think about, borrow and develop their laws, as described by 
Pritchard, and to make cross-cultural comparisons in unexpected places, as discussed by Kubal. 
Seeking to understand and analyse the laws and legal processes surrounding migration in Russia, 
Kubal undertook fieldwork to obtain qualitative data, including the experiences of migrants 
themselves. She found parallels between the ‘spiral effect of the law’, as she analyses it in Russia, 
and the ‘legal violence’ noted by scholars analysing the legal situation and migrant experiences in 
the US. Although not exactly the same, the cases were sufficiently similar to indicate global patterns 
or trends. As well as being interesting in its own right, this comparative exercise helps her analyse 
the Russian case, avoiding the picture of exceptionalism that can result from an overly narrow ‘law in 
context’ approach and embedding this case in a broader view of contemporary societies. 
The challenge in such cases is to identify significant similarities and to decide how to interpret them. 
Anthropologists seeking to analyse the data produced by ethnographic work, for example, typically 
search for analogies and recurrent themes in different cultural contexts, without preconceptions 
about what they may, or may not, find (Pirie, 2014). An essential element of this is deep familiarity 
with the studied case, allowing the researcher to assess the significance of the legal phenomena and 
on what terms analogies might be drawn. Can we assume that similar laws and legal practices reflect 
similar cultural beliefs and practices, or are they the result of legal borrowing? Should we look to 
political, social, historical, economic or other factors to explain similarity? The answers often lead on 
to other questions. 
The importance of research designed to identify, rather than assume, similarities amongst legal 
phenomena across social and cultural divides has maybe not been sufficiently emphasised in the 
literature on comparative law, although it has been present in social science studies. Rich empirical 
work is often the basis for the discovery of unexpected similarities. Finding that people do address 
similar issues in very different contexts is illuminating in and of itself: noting similarity in the 
appreciation of, and reactions to, social problems across cultural divides tells us something about 
recurrent human concerns and dynamics, or those that might be associated with specific social, 
political and economic contexts. This often gives rise to further questions, both about differences – 
do similar-looking laws or legal codes, in fact, play the same role in different contexts – and about 
the significance of those that do not share the same patterns – can we understand more about legal 
borrowing by considering contexts in which it seems to be refused? 
The identification of significant similarity here occurs against a backdrop of difference, thus avoiding 
the need to make assumptions about similarity at the outset. This type of comparison is rarely 
controlled or deliberate. As Örücü (2007, p. 49) notes, it generally begins with facts, rather than 
hypotheses, and ends in description; but, we might add, it is description that has been enriched by 
the comparison. 
Pritchard’s paper (in this issue) stands out because it involves the study of a form of comparison 
carried out by her informants themselves. Undertaking a longitudinal study of ideas about law and 
nation-building among Kosovar Albanians, she describes how the author of an early 
twentiethcentury legal code made explicit references to classical precedents as a way of establishing 
legitimacy for his text and for the emergent Albanian nation. At the same time, he emphasised 
distinctions between Albanian and other traditions, to create a sense of nationhood. Drawing 
comparisons and distinctions is not just a scholarly pursuit. 
V. Conclusions 
Comparison amongst studies of laws in contexts can follow different trajectories: the comparison 
may start from an assumption of similarity – in form, purposes or context – in order to identify 
significant differences or it may identify significant similarity across social and cultural divides. 
The complexity of socio-legal studies that results from the exploration of empirical detail offers 
possibilities as much as challenges. This is so whether the comparison is planned and systematic or it 
develops out of richness of qualitative research, and whether it involves small numbers of cases or 
more wide-ranging comparison. For scholars undertaking controlled or deliberate comparison – 
typically the search for difference against an assumption of similarity – empirical detail serves to 
nuance the terms of comparison, as it reveals complexity and allows the researchers to reassess 
assumptions of sameness. By contrast, the search for – or realisation of – similarity in the context of 
difference is often a means of extending and deepening analysis originally focused on a particular 
case-study; here, empirical detail serves to highlight similarity and to identify what may or may not 
be significant behind an appearance of sameness. Of course, in practice, comparative work may, and 
regularly does, involve elements of both. 
Undertaking qualitative empirical research is a means of coming to understand particular cases on 
their own terms. It requires the careful use of concepts that best capture the empirical reality of 
what is being considered and, to the extent that comparison is possible between different cases, the 
terms of comparison often emerge from the research itself, rather than being predefined in terms of 
categories or indicators. Here, the researcher’s own cultural sensitivity and scholarly discipline will 
play a role in making sense of the gathered data. 
One of the purposes of this special issue is to draw more recognition to the fact that comparison is a 
natural part of much good scholarship. In practice, we suggest, socio-legal scholars regularly 
undertake forms of comparison in different ways, often without being explicit about their methods 
and purposes. The diversity discussed and reflected in the many edited volumes on comparative law 
should not be regarded as a problem. Rather than searching for some ideal, prescriptive and 
methodologically precise form of comparison, the field should allow different approaches and 
purposes. We should make a virtue out of variety. What unites many of the projects of comparison 
undertaken by qualitative empirical researchers is that the points of relevant comparison are 
identified within the complexity of the empirical studies at hand, and they are allowed to emerge, or 
change, as the researcher comes to understand the facts and issues more deeply. Good comparison 
is often not the initial object, or it may be no more than a general aspiration or hunch that points of 
similarity will emerge in different cultural contexts. What is relevant and significant as the basis for 
comparison may not be apparent until those particular parts of the social world, in all their 
complexity, are understood on their own terms. This is the essence of the different approaches to 
comparison that are presented in the contributions to this special issue. 
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